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Abstract 
Analytic performance may be assessed by the nature of the process applied to intelligence tasks 
and analysts are expected to use a 'critical' or deliberative mindset. However, there is little 
research on how analysts do their work. We report the findings of a quantitative survey of 113 
intelligence analysts who were asked to report how often they would apply strategies involving 
more or less critical thinking when performing representative tasks along the analytic workflow. 
Analysts reported using ‘deliberative’ strategies significantly more often than ‘intuitive’ ones 
when capturing customer requirements, processing data, and communicating conclusions. Years 
of experience working in the intelligence community, skill level, analytic thinking training, and 
time spent working collaboratively (opposed to individually) were largely unrelated to reported 
strategy use. We discuss the implications of these findings for both improving intelligence 
analysis and developing an evidence-based approach to policy and practice in this domain. 
Keywords: Intelligence analysis, analytic workflow, intuition, deliberation, critical 
thinking 
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Introduction 
It is believed that the quality and accuracy of intelligence analysis will benefit from the 
use of critical thinking skills (see Harris & Spiker, 2011; Moore, 2007). According to cognitive 
scientists, critical thinking requires the use of System 2 or deliberative cognition (e.g., Evans & 
Over, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996). This is characterized as a conscious, controlled 
process that is shaped by formal education and intelligence. Deliberative thinking relies on 
working memory, and is a cognitively demanding, slow process which uses rule-based thinking 
and sequential processing of information. This is contrasted with System 1 or intuitive cognition, 
which is characterized as an unconscious, automatic process that is influenced by prior 
experience. Intuitive thinking does not rely on working memory. It requires little cognitive effort 
and is a fast process that uses associative thinking, and parallel processing of information. 
Researchers have empirically distinguished between the two modes of cognition and provided 
evidence of their operation (e.g., Hamm, 1988; Marewski & Melhorn, 2011; Rusou, Zakay, & 
Usher, 2013).  
There are, however, contrasting views on the relative value of intuitive and deliberative 
thinking. For instance, whereas some believe that intuition is an indicator of expertise (e.g., 
Klein, 1989; see also Klein, 2008; Patterson & Eggleston, 2017), others view it as a default mode 
of cognition that operates when the more superior deliberative mode is unavailable (e.g., Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974; see also Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Klein, 2009), while some consider 
the value of each mode to be determined by how well it matches the requirements of the task at 
hand (Hammond, 1996; 2000; 2010; see also Dhami & Thomson, 2012; Dhami & Mumpower, 
2018). Clearly, the value of each mode of cognition ought to be informed by what the individual 
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is trying to achieve, i.e., accuracy with respect to some criterion or coherence with respect to 
some standard or policy.  
The intelligence community has been heavily influenced by the position that intuition is a 
default mode of cognition that operates when the more superior deliberative mode is unavailable 
(see Heuer, 1999). In addition, although accuracy is the desired goal in intelligence analysis, 
analytic tasks are characterized by uncertainty that cannot easily be reduced. Relevant data may 
be missing and unreliable (as well as intentionally deceptive), data collection may be biased, and 
obtaining valid, reliable and timely outcome feedback is extremely difficult. Thus, the 
intelligence community has developed policies for practice in the hope that these will increase 
accuracy. Indeed, in their efforts to encourage analysts to adopt deliberative thinking, 
intelligence organizations train analysts in critical thinking skills including logic as well as in the 
application of so-called ‘structured analytic techniques’ that typically involve the application of 
specific rules in a sequential process (e.g., Advanced Technical Intelligence Center, 2014; 
Intelligence and Security Academy, 2014; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007; 
UK Ministry of Defence, 2013; US Government, 2009; see also Dhami, Belton, & Careless, 
2016).  
Nevertheless, as Heuer and Pherson (2008) highlight, rather than applying critical 
thinking, analysts may opt for a narrow and sometimes inappropriate range of strategies. These 
might be strategies they learned during their formal education; those that are readily available to 
them; those which save time; and those driven by readily available data (even if it is not pertinent 
to solving the task at hand). It is argued that the use of such strategies is likely to lead to biased 
and erroneous conclusions, which can potentially misinform decision-makers. In addition, there 
may be negative resource costs of ineffective working practices.  
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In the present paper, we examine analysts’ reported use of strategies classed as involving 
more or less critical thinking (i.e., deliberative or intuitive) in an effort to better understand how 
analysts work, and to contribute to the small, but growing body of extant research on intelligence 
analysis. There is a general dearth of empirical research in this domain, which not only limits our 
understanding of an important area of applied cognitive psychology, but which also thwarts 
efforts to strive for an evidence-based approach to the training and assessment of analysts (see 
Dhami, Mandel, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2015).   
Past Research on Analysts’ Working Practices 
To date, only a handful of studies have attempted to describe the analytic strategies used 
by intelligence analysts. Pirolli, Lee and Card (2004, see also Pirolli and Card, 2005) studied two 
analysts with over 20 years’ experience each. The analysts completed a simulated problem of 
their choice using open source data, while using a think-aloud protocol (i.e., self-reporting their 
reasoning while performing a task). They spent most of their time finding information, extracting 
it, and making basic inferences about patterns in the data.  
Trent, Voshell and Patterson (2007) observed four groups of 10 military analysts with on 
average four years’ experience, completing a task during a five-day training exercise. The groups 
provided daily briefs and were assessed based on whether they arrived at a preferred conclusion 
and if this was conveyed with sufficient analytic rigor. The two ‘successful’ groups had arranged 
their workspace to allow for maximum interaction between members and shared their thinking 
by adding relevant dates to a wall-sized calendar. At times, all teams had either dedicated too 
much time to performing individual (cognitive) tasks and not enough to collaboration or vice, 
versa. None of the groups used a structured approach to hypothesis testing and instead preferred 
a narrative approach.   
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Chin, Kuchar, and Wolf (2009) studied five experienced analysts working on two 
hypothetical scenarios involving individual and collaborative analysis, respectively. Analysts had 
to write and present a report. It was found that analysts organized the information, and 
highlighted and extracted facts. However, analysts’ judgments of the credibility of information 
and sources were subjective and depended on their experiences. Analysts also relied on personal 
knowledge when attempting to identify patterns and trends in the data. They shifted into new 
lines of queries and investigations before eventually converging on a coherent story. Analysts 
said they would abandon a systematic approach to analysis when working under time pressure. 
Collaboration enabled analysts to devote more time to resolving discrepancies in the data.  
In Patterson, Roth and Woods’ (2001) study, 10 analysts with seven to 30 years’ 
experience were presented with a simulated problem based on a real past event. They had access 
to a database of 2,000 (mostly relevant) text documents. Analysts used a think-aloud protocol to 
describe how they would analyze the data. Data from two analysts could not be examined, but 
the remainder narrowed down the dataset using basic queries and browsing the dates and titles of 
the documents. They opened from four to 29 documents and selected one to four ‘key’ 
documents, and searched for corroboration and information that resolved discrepancies, in an 
effort to synthesize the data into a coherent story. Consequently, analysts missed highly relevant 
data. Half of the analysts used ‘high-profit’ documents – they spent more time on analysis and 
read more documents. This did not result in more accurate statements, although it did lead to 
fewer inaccurate statements. Inaccurate statements were based on default assumptions and 
incorrect or out-of-date information.  
Roth et al. (2010, Study 2) studied six analysts with eight or more years’ experience over 
a four-day period, as they responded to six information requests associated with the same 
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hypothetical problem. Analysts performed some tasks using a prototype decision aid and other 
tasks unaided. Data was collected using a think-aloud protocol. Analysts used several strategies 
including expanding and reframing the request (e.g., by including pre- and post-conditions and 
implied questions, and removing restrictive assumptions). They also used meta-information to 
guide selection of collection assets (e.g., tolerance for instability of information over time, and 
time taken to analyze and integrate new information). In addition, analysts used contextual cues 
to assess their confidence in being able to respond to the request in time, and these contextual 
cues included the complexity of the search space, the redundancy and diversity of sources and 
the need to coordinate across organizations. Thus, these analysts actively engaged in problem 
reformulation and demonstrated awareness of some of the factors that may affect their analysis.  
Finally, Dhami and Careless (2015a) conducted an experiment involving 15 analysts with 
on average eight years’ experience, who were divided into three groups. The analysts had to 
produce a written report after performing a representative task. Two groups worked 
collaboratively (i.e., distributed or co-located) and one group worked individually. Analysts had 
access to 29 documents: about a third did not contain any useful intelligence, the rest contained 
key intelligence and/or corroborative information, and a few were in a foreign language. The 
researchers measured the quality of the reports as well as the accuracy of the conclusions drawn. 
It was found that analysts working individually produced better quality reports measured on a 
number of criteria (e.g., descriptive analysis, analytic filtering, and communicating analysis) than 
those working collaboratively. In all reports, descriptive analysis was strong but there was a lack 
of critical thinking. None of the reports contained accurate conclusions. The three groups 
differed in how they structured their activities. For instance, the co-located group divided 
information across individuals in the team according to their expertise. Everyone in the 
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distributed group skimmed through all of the documents before dividing them amongst members. 
Those working individually read all of the documents, summarizing, grouping and prioritizing 
them, drawing hypotheses and testing them, before deciding on next steps. 
In sum, it is difficult to paint a clear picture of how experienced analysts work. This is 
partly because different studies focused on different stages of the analytic workflow, with only 
one examining all stages (Dhami & Careless, 2015a). The sorts of cognitive and practical skills 
that can be useful at each stage may differ. For example, at the obtain data stage analysts must 
select relevant data from the most appropriate sources in an efficient manner, as well as establish 
new sources of data if necessary, whereas at the interpret outputs stage, analysts must evaluate 
alternative explanations for the (often incomplete) ‘facts’, and construct logical arguments to 
support conclusions as well as dismiss alternative ones, determine the degree of uncertainty in 
these conclusions, and identify any ambiguities. Past research also does not distinguish, a priori, 
between strategies involving more or less critical thinking (deliberation versus intuition), thus 
rendering the evaluation of analytic practices as somewhat post hoc. Problematically, past 
research has involved qualitative methods and small samples of analysts thus rendering the 
findings unreliable and lacking in generalizability. Finally, no-one has systematically explored 
how the strategies that analysts may use are associated with their training and experiences. This 
information can be used to assess the effectiveness of analytic training and identify the sorts of 
experiences that promote or hinder a deliberative approach to analysis.  
The Present Research 
The primary goal was to measure how often analysts report using ‘deliberative’ and 
‘intuitive’ strategies when solving specific tasks at each stage of the analytic workflow. There is 
insufficient past research to draw a priori predictions about the frequency of analysts’ use of such 
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strategies at specific stages of the workflow. In order to overcome some of the shortcomings of 
past research, we sampled a large number of analysts, classed strategies a priori as involving 
more or less critical thinking, and examined each stage of the workflow. 
A secondary goal was to explore the association between how often analysts said they 
would apply a particular class of strategy and the number of years they had worked in the 
intelligence community, their analytic skill level, whether or not they had completed analytic 
thinking training, and the proportion of time they spent working collaboratively (opposed to 
individually). 
In terms of the relationship between analytic experience and strategy use, contrasting 
views on intuitive and deliberative thinking would lead us to make different predictions. For 
instance, whereas some believe that expertise leads to greater use of intuitive thinking (e.g., 
Klein, 1989; see also Klein, 2008; Hammond, 1996; 2000; 2010), others suggest this mode of 
cognition is indicative of less expertise (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; see also Kahneman, 
2011; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). However, as we mention earlier, characteristics of the 
intelligence domain such as the degree of uncertainty and lack of feedback may make it difficult 
to develop expertise (see also Harvey, 2011). In addition, the fact that intelligence organizations 
train their analysts to apply critical thinking and structured analytic techniques means that we 
would predict a positive relationship between years of experience working in the intelligence 
community and use of deliberative strategies, and a negative relationship between experience 
and the use of intuitive strategies.  
Intelligence organizations typically assess the skill level of their analysts in performing 
specific analytic tasks (e.g., writing reports, using geospatial technology). It would be reasonable 
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to hypothesize that a higher overall skill level would be positively associated with the use of 
deliberative strategies and negatively associated with the use of intuitive strategies.  
Similarly, given that analytic thinking training typically includes teaching critical 
thinking skills and structured analytic techniques, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that 
analysts who have completed such training will report greater use of deliberative strategies and 
less use of intuitive ones compared to analysts who have not completed such training.  
Finally, collaborative analysis is often encouraged because there is a belief that it helps to 
overcome the limitations of individual analysis (see e.g., Cooper, 2005). Past studies on 
collaborative versus individual analysis, however, report mixed findings as to the respective 
benefits of these two ways of working (e.g., Convertino, Billman, Pirolli, Massar, & Shrager, 
2008; Dhami & Careless, 2015a; Woolley, Gerbasi, Chabris, Kosslyn, & Hackman, 2008). Some 
psychological research suggests that collaborative working can lead to cognitive loafing (Weldon 
& Gargano, 1985; 1988). Nevertheless, it is unclear how an analyst who spends the majority of 
his or time working collaboratively will be affected when working individually, and so we 
refrain from making a directional prediction with regard to the relationship between the extent of 
collaborative working and frequency of use of intuitive and deliberative strategies. 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 113 practicing intelligence analysts volunteered to participate in the research 
(details of their recruitment are provided in the procedure section below). These analysts answer 
strategic and tactical intelligence questions across a variety of domains such as counter-
terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and military. To do so, they draw upon both structured and 
unstructured data derived from a range of sources including publically available material.  
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Just over half (56.8%) of the sample were male. The mean age was 37.27 years (SD = 
10.28). Nearly all (92.8%) were employed to work on a full-time basis. The sample reported 
having a mean of 5.18 years of experience (SD = 3.38) working in the intelligence community. 
The mean proportion of time analysts said they worked collaboratively/as part of a team was 
35.68% (SD = 22.31). Analysts’ overall skill level ranged from 0 to 53 (M = 17.86, SD = 9.08) as 
measured on a 0 to 84 scale used by the organization from which the sample was drawn.1 Thirty-
three percent said they had completed analytic thinking training.2  
Survey 
A survey was designed by a team of experienced analysts (including those with 
management duties) and analytic trainers in collaboration with the authors. We endeavored to 
ensure that the tasks along the analytic workflow were representative of those that may be 
conducted within the intelligence organization from which the participants were drawn.3 The 
survey comprised four parts, two of which are relevant to the present research (and are available 
from the first author).4  
One part of the survey elicited demographic information regarding participants’ gender, 
age, work status, years of experience working in the intelligence community, proportion of time 
spent per week working collaboratively (as opposed to individually), skill level, and analytic 
thinking training. 
The other part of the survey presented participants with six scenarios that each 
represented the six stages of the analytic workflow (i.e., capture requirements, plan analytic 
                                                          
1 The organization rates analysts on 21 different analytical skills, and each one has five levels from zero to four. 
2 This involves learning critical thinking skills, structured analytic techniques and about cognitive biases. 
3 An early version of the survey was pilot tested on a sample of 60 analysts from the same organization (who did not 
participate in final data collection). This was primarily used to streamline the survey and clarify the wording of 
specific items. 
4 The other two parts examined how analysts would order an analytic workflow and their preferred thinking style, 
and some of the findings are reported in Dhami and Careless (2015b). 
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response, obtain data, process data, interpret outputs, and communicate conclusions, see Dhami 
& Careless, 2015b). Each scenario referred to a different intelligence problem and so there were 
no dependencies across stages. For example, Scenario 5 referred to the interpret outputs stage of 
the workflow. Participants were told: “You have just gained a memory stick which was seized 
from one of your key suspects during the arrest of his associate. It holds a massive amount of 
data. You think the suspect is involved in money laundering which is ultimately used to fund 
illegal businesses. There is some reporting which confirms this, however, the source is new and 
un-validated. You have so far only been able to find very scarce other information on the suspect 
which mostly consists of SMS and occasional email. You have never been able to establish the 
topics of these conversations and think they are coded. As you have been unable to find enough 
evidence to validate your money laundering hypothesis you are due to be moved off onto another 
investigation in one week’s time, unless the new data sheds more light on the situation.”  
For each scenario, participants were asked: “In this situation, how often do you do the 
following things?” They were then presented with four alternative strategies that could be used 
for solving each task.5 Two of these were a priori classed as involving more or less critical 
thinking (i.e., deliberative or intuitive), although participants were not told this. The strategies 
classed as ‘intuitive’ were ones that experienced analysts (including those with management 
duties) and analytic trainers believed that analysts may opt for if they had less training, skills and 
experience, and wanted to reduce effort. By contrast, the strategies classed as ‘deliberative’ were 
ones that analysts may opt for if they had more training, skills and experience, and were willing 
to expend more effort. For example, the strategies presented with Scenario 5 were: (1) 
“Systematically look through all the data retrieved, summarizing the key points as you go.” (2) 
                                                          
5 At the end of this part of the survey, participants also had an opportunity to provide additional responses by 
reporting any other strategies that they may use, however, few did so. 
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“Search for data that will specifically corroborate or disprove any of your hypotheses about the 
situation.” (3) “Map the relationships between the key points, making a distinction between facts 
and hypotheses.” (4) Quickly try and determine the ‘story’ behind the data and find information 
to corroborate this.”  Here, strategies (1) and (4) were classed as intuitive and (2) and (3) as 
deliberative. Participants provided a rating for each strategy on a 5-point scale labelled at each 
point (i.e., 1 = “never”, 2 = “a little”, 3 = “some”, 4 = “a lot”, and 5 = “always”).  
Procedure  
Analysts were recruited via advertisements on the intranet of a UK intelligence 
organization. These adverts stated that the research was led and designed by a non-employee. 
Analysts were informed that participation was voluntary and anonymous. The survey was 
available online for a two-week period on the intelligence organization’s intranet, and 
participants completed the survey during their normal workday.  
Analysis and Findings 
The data analysis and findings are presented below in relation to the two main goals of 
the present research described earlier. 
Analysts’ Strategy Use 
The primary goal was to examine how often analysts said they would use strategies 
classed as ‘intuitive’ and ‘deliberative’ when solving tasks along each stage of the analytic 
workflow. Figure 1 presents the means (and standard deviations) of the frequency with which 
analysts said they would apply each class of strategy along each stage of the workflow. For 
simplicity, the responses to the two strategies classed as intuitive at each stage were averaged, as 
were the responses to the two strategies classed as deliberative.  Higher scores indicate more 
frequent application of a strategy.  
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In order to determine if there were any statistically significant differences in the mean 
frequency with which analysts said they would apply each class of strategy, we computed paired 
samples t-tests for each stage of the workflow.6 There were no significant differences observed at 
the plan analytic response stage (t[112] = 0.22, p = .826, d = .02 ), obtain data stage (t[112] = 
1.37, p = .173, d = .13) and interpret outputs stage (t[112] = 1.38, p = .170, d = -.13). Here, 
analysts said they would apply deliberative strategies as often as intuitive ones. 
However, there was a statistically significant difference in the reported frequency of 
application of intuitive versus deliberative strategies at the process data stage (t[112] = 7.88, p < 
.001, d = -.74) and communicate conclusions stage (t[112] = 11.43, p < .001, d = -1.07). The 
difference was marginally significant at the capture requirements stage (t[112] = 1.87, p = .064, d 
= -.17). As Figure 1 shows, analysts said they would apply deliberative strategies more 
frequently than intuitive strategies when capturing requirements, processing data and 
communicating conclusions.  
Strategy Use and Analysts’ Experiences, Skills and Training 
A secondary goal of the present research was to explore the association between how 
often analysts said they would apply each class of strategy and their years of experience working 
in the intelligence community, skill level, analytic thinking training, and the proportion of time 
they spent working collaboratively.  
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were computed between the number of years that 
analysts had worked in the intelligence community and how often they said they would apply 
                                                          
6 These tests were two-tailed, and a Bonferroni correction was applied to the alpha level. 
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each class of strategy at each stage of the workflow.7 None of these correlations were statistically 
significant (rs excluding sign ranged from .02 to .13, ps > .05, ns = 111). 
Pearson’s correlations were also computed between analysts’ overall skill level and how 
often they said they would use each class of strategy at each stage of the workflow.8 The 
correlations (excluding sign) ranged from .32 to .23 (ns = 111), and all but one were non-
significant (ps > .05). For the one statistically significant correlation, we found that contrary to 
the prediction, there was a significant positive relationship between overall skill level and use of 
an intuitive strategy at the communicate conclusions stage (r = .23, p = .015). 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the reported frequency of use of 
each class of strategy at each stage of the workflow by whether or not analysts had completed 
analytic thinking training. With one exception, independent samples t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant differences in how often analysts with and without analytic thinking 
training said they would apply each class of strategy at most of the stages of the workflow.9 For 
the one exception, there was a significant difference in the reported use of deliberative strategies 
at the communicate conclusions stage (t[111] = 1.68, p = .048). As Table 1 shows, and in line 
with the prediction, compared to their counterparts who had not completed analytic thinking 
training, those who had, reported greater frequency of using deliberative strategies at this stage.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Finally, correlations were also computed between the proportion of time (per week) that 
analysts spent working collaboratively, and how often they said they would use each class of 
strategy at each stage of the workflow.10 The correlations (excluding sign) ranged from .02 to .29 
                                                          
7 These tests were one-tailed. 
8 These tests were one-tailed. 
9 These tests were one-tailed. 
10 These tests were two-tailed. 
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(ns = 111), and all but two were non-significant (ps > .05). For these two, there was a significant 
positive relationship between time spent working collaboratively and use of a deliberative 
strategy at the plan analytic response stage (r = .29, p = .002), and the use of an intuitive strategy 
at the obtain data stage (r = .24, p = .011). 
Discussion 
Although analysts are expected to approach analytic tasks with a critical mindset, there is 
a dearth of empirical research on how analysts do their work. The small body of extant research 
employs qualitative, concurrent or retrospective self-report methods to examine how small 
samples of experienced analysts work at specific stages of the analytic workflow (Chin et al., 
2009; Dhami & Careless, 2015a; Patterson et al., 2001; Pirolli et al., 2004; Pirolli & Card, 2005; 
Roth et al., 2010; Trent et al., 2007). Thus, much of what we know about how analysts do their 
work comes from post hoc investigations into intelligence failures (e.g., Butler, Chilcot, Peter, 
Mates, Taylor, 2004; Pfeiffer, 1984). However, the generalizability of their findings can be 
extremely limited. The present research aimed to shed more light on analytic practices by using a 
quantitative method to examine how often a large sample of analysts said they would apply 
strategies classed as ‘deliberative’ and ‘intuitive’ to solving (independent) problems, at each 
stage of the analytic workflow. In addition, we explored factors that may be associated with the 
application of each class of strategy.  
Although we attempted to overcome some of the shortcomings of past research, some 
limitations remain. The primary one is the reliance on self-report data. In using a retrospective 
self-report method we avoided concerns relating to concurrent self-report (think-aloud) methods, 
namely that they may interfere with the processes being studied and that they face the challenges 
associated with introspecting and articulating cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
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Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989). However, our method is potentially problematic due to 
difficulties in recall (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and the opportunities it affords for social 
desirability response bias (Paulhus, 1991). These concerns are somewhat muted by the fact that 
analysts were asked to recall strategies they use for tasks they perform on a daily basis, and any 
response bias would likely manifest in reports of greater use of deliberative rather than intuitive 
strategies, which did not occur. In addition, one could argue that our method is akin to that used 
by intelligence organizations themselves, who typically assess the quality of the analytic process 
based on analysts’ reports of how they arrived at a specific conclusion. Nevertheless, future 
research should use a mixed methods design whereby self-report data is triangulated with 
behavioral data (e.g., from controlled experiments, observations, intelligence reports). Bearing 
this limitation in mind, below we summarize and discuss the present findings. 
Deliberation versus Intuition 
Analysts said they would use deliberative strategies more often than intuitive ones at the 
initial and final stages of the workflow. This is compatible with studies suggesting that analysts 
try to grasp the operational aim and context before starting their work (Dhami & Careless, 
2015a), and that they may expand and reframe the question (Roth et al., 2010). The findings are 
also consistent with Dhami and Careless (2015a) who reported that analysts aim to 
communicate/present their analysis in a clear and meaningful way, highlighting areas of 
uncertainty, and distinguishing between objective fact and subjective judgment. Most 
intelligence organizations place considerable value on customer engagement and satisfaction, 
and intelligence products represent a tangible output of analytic work. The present findings 
suggest that analysts may actively consider the question posed in order to produce reports that 
are customer-focused. 
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Analysts also said they would use deliberative strategies more often than intuitive ones at 
the processing data stage. This contrasts with studies suggesting that analysts perform routine 
and simple operations on data, looking for basic patterns (Chin et al., 2009; Patterson et al., 
2001; Pirolli & Card, 2004). It is unclear to what extent methodological differences can explain 
the disparity in findings as past studies have used think-aloud protocols whereas we used a 
survey method eliciting self-reports of how analysts say they perform a task. The fact is that 
intelligence organizations often invest heavily in developing tradecraft, tools and technology, 
and so it may not be surprising that, as we find, analysts use more critical thinking at this stage of 
the workflow.  
There was no significant difference in how often analysts said they would use intuitive 
and deliberative strategies at the plan analytic response, obtain data and interpret outputs stages 
of the workflow. The preference for approaching analytic tasks in a routine manner means that 
analysts may not adapt sufficiently to emerging analytic problems (i.e., those that require 
different/new working practices) and they may spend too much of their limited time wading 
through data. Past research suggests that although analysts may consider some of the factors that 
might affect their ability to respond to an intelligence question (Roth et al., 2010); they may also 
ignore potentially relevant data (Patterson et al., 2001; Pirolli & Card, 2004); and may rely on 
subjective interpretations of the data, seeking to confirm their ideas (Chin et al., 2009; Patterson 
et al., 2001; Pirolli & Card, 2004; Trent et al., 2007). Intelligence organizations could place 
greater emphasis on training analysts to carefully plan their analytic response, as well as freeing 
analysts’ time by automating information searches where possible, and supporting critical 
thinking via a combination of training and technology. 
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These latter set of findings also suggest that future research could also explore 
Hammond’s (1996) assertion that intelligence analysis requires the use of both System 2 
(deliberative) and System 1 (intuitive) thinking. According to Hammond’s (1996; 2000; 2010; 
see also Dhami & Thomson, 2012) cognitive continuum theory, cognition moves along a 
continuum from System 1 to System 2. Quasirationality lies in-between and refers to a 
combination of intuitive and deliberative thinking. Thus, sometimes an analyst may use more 
intuition than deliberation, other times she may use more deliberation than intuition, and at other 
times the use of these two modes of cognition may be equal. The present research did not 
examine quasirational strategies, and in fact, the operationalization of intuitive and deliberative 
strategies was quite broad. Future research is warranted to examine the extent to which analysts 
apply more precisely specified strategies that are wholly deliberative, wholly intuitive or 
quasirational (a combination of both deliberation and intuition) strategies when solving tasks 
along the analytic workflow. 
Future research could also examine other propositions in Hammond’s theory in order to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of best working practices in intelligence analysis.11 
Hammond (1996, 2000) proposed that the mode of cognition used is induced by properties of the 
task. For instance, tasks characterized by a large amount of information, containing some 
redundancy and requiring subjective interpretation would induce intuitive thinking (see also 
Patterson, 2017). By contrast, tasks involving less information, with less redundancy and 
requiring objective interpretation would induce deliberative thinking. Tasks such as intelligence 
analysis that comprise a combination of properties inducing intuitive and deliberative thinking 
                                                          
11 There is psychological evidence to support the propositions made by Hammond’s theory (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, 
Mahan, Marino, & Chu-Chun, 2000; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009; Hamm, 1988; Hammond, Hamm, 
Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Mahan, 1994; Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011; Rusou, Zakay, & Usher, 2013; Seifert & 
Hadida, 2013). 
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would induce quasirationality. In addition, Hammond suggested that the upper level of cognitive 
performance is dictated by the match between properties of the task and mode of cognition. 
Thus, deliberative thinking alone may be neither necessary nor sufficient for ceiling-level 
performance, and in fact, quasirational (or even intuitive) thinking may produce better 
performance (and outcomes) under certain conditions. An understanding of the effects of the 
correspondence between cognitive mode and task properties in the intelligence analysis domain 
can be useful in helping to infer the potential accuracy of intelligence products, which is 
important given the challenges associated with obtaining outcome feedback in this domain. 
Analytic Experiences, Skills and Training 
The present research also explored the relationship between how often analysts said they 
would use intuitive versus deliberative strategies and their experiences, skills and training. This 
included an exploration of the relationship between the number of years analysts had worked in 
the intelligence community and their reported frequency of strategy use. There was little 
evidence of a relationship between these two variables. The small sample sizes used in past 
research has precluded direct comparisons of more and less experienced analysts, however, the 
literature we reviewed earlier suggests that experienced analysts do not necessarily demonstrate 
more critical thinking in spite of the efforts made by intelligence organizations. Although the 
present study used a broad measure of experience (similar to past research), the findings we 
discuss below with regard to the relationship between reported strategy use and analysts’ skill 
level and training suggest that it may be difficult for analysts to develop a degree of expertise 
that distinguishes between the working practices of more and less experienced analysts. Indeed, 
analysts may opt to develop skills and complete training at different points in their career 
meaning that these variables are not necessarily positively related to experience. 
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We did not find much evidence of a relationship between analysts’ overall skill level and 
their reported strategy use. The skill levels measured by intelligence organizations typically 
reflect specific technical and tradecraft skills (e.g., writing reports, using geospatial technology). 
The disconnect between skill level and strategy use suggests that intelligence organizations may 
wish to reconfigure the concept of technical and tradecraft skill level within a broader cognitive 
framework for approaching analytic tasks. Indeed, some practical skills may require more (and 
similar) elements of deliberative thinking than others, and so these could be grouped together for 
both training and assessment purposes. Currently, training in specific technical and tradecraft 
skills is quite separate from training in analytic thinking skills, partly because the intelligence 
community has been slow in acknowledging that analysis is fundamentally a cognitive activity. 
We argue that instead of thinking skills being an ‘add on’ they should form a basis for the 
consideration of practical technical and tradecraft skills.  
First, however, the intelligence community may wish to rethink the contents of its 
analytic thinking training. This is because we did not observe many systematic differences in 
reported strategy use amongst analysts who had completed analytic thinking training and their 
counterparts who had not. Analytic thinking training typically includes a focus on critical 
thinking and the use of specific analytic techniques (e.g., Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2007; UK Ministry of Defence, 2013; US Government, 2009). However, there is no 
conceptual framework to tie these thinking skills together. There is also an overemphasis on 
cognitive bias, with few debiasing instructions beyond telling analysts to ‘be aware of bias!’ (see 
Belton & Dhami, in press). Future research could further explore reasons for the apparently 
limited benefits of analytic thinking training. Is such training potentially ineffective because: (a) 
The material is not sufficiently integrated into a useful cognitive framework? (b) Analysts do not 
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fully understand the material being taught? (c) The training rarely puts the material in the context 
of performing specific sorts of analytic tasks along each stage of the workflow? (d) Analysts lack 
the ability to put their training into practice? (e) A combination of the aforementioned factors?  
Finally, there is an increasing emphasis on collaborative analysis and this has led to a 
growing industry in collaborative analytic technologies. However, the trend has not been 
informed by any empirical evidence on the effectiveness of collaboration. We found no 
significant association between the proportion of time analysts spent per week working 
collaboratively (opposed to individually) and how frequently they said they would apply each 
class of strategy. Whereas collaborative working did not appear to have the deleterious effect on 
individual cognition that some have suggested (Weldon & Gargano, 1985; 1988), it also did not 
have a particularly beneficial impact on analysts’ working practices as some believe (e.g., 
Hackman & Woolley, 2011). Some research suggests that the nature of the collaboration may be 
key to its potential success (e.g., Convertino et al., 2008; Dhami & Careless, 2015a; Woolley et 
al., 2008). Therefore, future research ought to use other measures of collaborative working (e.g., 
co-located v. distributed, diversity, role in a team, tasks performed collaboratively) before 
drawing any definite conclusions regarding the impact of collaboration. For now, our findings, 
along with those of some past research, suggest that the intelligence community’s penchant for 
collaborative analysis may not be supported by the evidence. 
Unfortunately, the policies and practices developed and promulgated by intelligence 
organizations tend not to be based on scientific theories, methods or research (see National 
Research Council, 2011; Pool, 2010). We believe that the intelligence community should adopt 
an evidence-based approach to training and assessing its analysts. As Dhami et al. (2015) point 
out, an evidence-based approach would not only address critics’ concerns about the effectiveness 
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of analytic practices, which could ultimately mitigate the risk of future intelligence failures, but 
such an approach could also strengthen the intelligence community’s accountability processes. 
As the present study demonstrates, an evidence-based approach could borrow from theories and 
methods in the field of Decision Science specifically and cognitive psychology more generally.  
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Table 1. Frequency of Application of Intuitive Versus Deliberative Strategies by Stages of 
the Analytic Workflow and Analysts’ Analytic Thinking Training 
 
 
 
Stage of workflow 
 
 
Strategy class 
Training (n = 47) No training (n = 66) 
M frequency of 
application (SD) 
M frequency of  
application (SD) 
Capture requirements Intuitive 3.88 (.70) 3.97 (.76) 
Deliberative 4.17 (.78) 4.03 (.84) 
Plan analytic response Intuitive 3.80 (.81) 4.01 (.97) 
Deliberative 3.88 (.54) 3.91 (.74) 
Obtain data Intuitive 3.82 (.62) 3.58 (.91) 
Deliberative 3.59 (.75) 3.55 (.89) 
Process data Intuitive 3.52 (.79) 3.30 (.75) 
Deliberative 3.97 (.58) 4.04 (.74) 
Interpret outputs Intuitive 3.52 (.87) 3.58 (.96) 
Deliberative 3.72 (.79) 3.61 (.92) 
Communicate conclusions Intuitive 2.24 (.79) 2.28 (1.03) 
Deliberative 3.88 (.87) 3.60 (.92) 
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Figure 1. Frequency of Application of Intuitive and Deliberative Strategies by Stages of the 
Analytic Workflow 
    
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
